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ARGUMENT 
Our system of government is sustained through critical checks and balances. This 
appeal highlights the necessity for similar checks and balances in the administration of the 
State's property tax system. It underscores the public policy rationale behind this Court's 
ruling that: 
[I]f the assessor had no right of appeal from board of equalization 
decisions, many decisions would be insulated from review altogether. 
Certainly, taxpayers who successfully contest an assessment would have no 
reason to appeal, if a board of equalization erred in construing 
constitutional or statutory provisions in the a taxpayer's favor. In that case, 
the decision would stand because there would be no one who both would 
and could appeal. Consequently, the constitutional requirements that 
assessments be both uniform and represent fair-market value would be 
undermined. 
Kimball Condos. Owners Ass'n v. County Bd. of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642, (Utah 1997). 
If left unchallenged, the actions of Alliant Techsystems Inc., ("ATK") and the Salt 
Lake County Board of Equalization ("BOE") to refund $5 million dollars of real and 
personal property taxes without lawful authority or justification would have 
inappropriately redistributed a significant tax burden to all other County taxpayers 
without regard to uniformity and equality. This appeal reveals the subtle attempt by a 
taxpayer and a taxing authority to refund real and personal property taxes in violation of 
the Utah constitution and in disregard of deeply rooted tax law principles and sound 
public policy. 
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Background 
Salt Lake County Assessor Lee Gardner ("Gardner") was informed in the early 
Fall of 2000 that the BOE and ATK were discussing settlement of property tax litigation 
pending before the State Tax Commission and Tax Court regarding the fair market 
assessments of ATK's real and personal property for 1995 through 1999. He learned that 
the proposed agreement was to be a single lump sum tax refund covering all five (5) years 
("Agreement"). Concerned over the form of the Agreement, Gardner urged them not to 
settle on tax dollars, but to resolve disputed valuation methodologies on their merits. 
Although a separately named party to the pending Independent Action, Gardner was 
kicked out of all further negotiations. Gardner Bf. pp. 9-11. 
In November of 2000, Granite School District ("Granite") learned of the 
settlement discussions. Granite was at risk to refund nearly half of any refund of property 
taxes to ATK and subsequently intervened in the tax court and administrative 
proceedings. Id. p. 10. 
On 30 November of 2000, ATK submitted a proposed Agreement to the BOE 
seeking a lump sum settlement for real and personal property. On 5 December 2000, the 
BOE countered with an offer to refund a lump sum of $5 million as settlement of all 
outstanding property tax claims for 1995 through 1999. [R. 1412] The lump sum tax 
refund was not intended to reflect anyone's idea of fair market value. [R. 2591]. 
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On 6 December 2000, the Salt Lake County Commission publicly discussed the 
Agreement. [R. 1687]. Gardner and Granite both voiced concern over the Agreement at 
the meeting and objected to its inequities. He was concerned with the tax shift it would 
place on other taxpayers. The Commissioners approved the Agreement, [R. 1683]. 
Gardner and Granite challenged the legality of the Agreement at the Tax Commission 
and Tax Court. 
Initially, the Tax Commission and the Tax Court both rejected the Agreement. The 
Tax Commission because of Granite's intervention. The Tax Court because the $5 million 
refund was indivisible and non-allocatable between the various tax years. After appealing 
the Tax Commission's valuation ruling on the 1997-1999 tax years and dismissing its 
personal property appeals, however, ATK asked the Tax Court to reconsider the validity 
of the Agreement. The Tax Court reconsidered its prior ruling and issued it final decision 
on 30 June 2003, ruling the Agreement was legal, enforceable and constitutional. [R. 
2866]. 
The Tax Court's final decision, prepared by ATK, cites literally no authority for its 
ruling - no citation to statutory, constitutional or common law. No justifying analysis. 
Rather, it is ladened with bald empty conclusions. Not once does the Tax Court cite, let 
alone analyze the plain language of the Utah Constitution, or any statute contained under 
Chapter 2 of Title 59 of the Utah Code on property taxation, or any statute contained in 
any chapter of Title 17 pertaining to Counties, including Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315, on 
which ATK places such weight. ATK claims section 315 grants the county executive 
3 
unchecked authority to settle any matter, in any way, at any time. The Tax Court decision 
is flawed because it lacks analysis and there was no authority for ATK and the BOE to 
settle in the form they tried. 
L THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW PRESENT QUESTIONS OF LAW THAT 
MUST BE REVIEWED UNDER A CORRECTION OF ERROR 
STANDARD. 
A. Whether an Agreement is legal, enforceable and constitutional that refunds 
$5 million in a single lump sum payment for five years of property tax without 
reference to fair market value is a question of law, not fact. 
ATK's begins its analysis by creating a strawman - a distorted and twisted 
misstatement of the pertinent issues and relevant standard of review placed before this 
Court by Gardner and Granite. For example, ATK misrepresents on page 5 of its brief that 
Appellants' primary legal issue is whether the County Executive is vested with plenary 
authority to settle litigation and that the primary policy issue is whether the County 
Executive ought to have such authority. ATK Bf. p. 5. ATK's attempt to mislead the 
Court is without merit. This appeal is not about anyone's authority to settle, but it is 
about the lawfulness of the form of settlement. Focusing on the authority to settle 
mischaracterizes the challenges brought by Gardner and Granite and the essence of this 
appeal because the Authority to settle is swallowed up in the illegality of its form. 
Gardner's issue for review by this Court is whether the Tax Court erred by ruling that the 
form of the Agreement which granted a five year property tax exemption to ATK was 
legal, enforceable and constitutional. While ATK might want to misfocus the Court and 
argue that county executive has absolute authority, there is no basis in law to sustaining 
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such proposition. Certainly ATK will not contend that the BOE or county executive have 
absolute power to enter into illegal agreements even under the guise of public policy that 
favors settlement. On its face, such a position is ludicrous. 
ATK argues that the standard of review for whether the Tax Court erred in ruling 
the Agreement was legal, enforceable and constitutional presents is based on a question 
of fact, i.e.,whether there is "substantial evidence" to support a finding that the 
Agreement was achieved in good faith because the law vesting authority in the County 
Executive to settle "all lawsuits and other actions" was statutorily, and therefore 
conclusively, resolved in ATK's favor on December 6, 2000 when the Salt Lake County 
Commissioners ratified/approved the Agreement. ATK Brief p. 3. Though awkwardly 
worded, ATK asserts that the only inquiry by this Court is whether the parties acted in 
good faith. Nothing more. ATK contends that as long as the Agreement was entered into 
in good faith, it must be legal, because Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(1) gives the county 
executive absolute unbridled authority. Thus, ATK continues, any Agreement entered into 
in good faith must be legal. It must be enforceable and must be constitutional. Apparently, 
ATK believes that mere good faith between parties is sufficient to overcome illegal 
conduct. ATK then argues that good faith is a question of fact. And a question of fact is 
reviewed under the "substantial evidence" standard requiring an appellant to "marshall" 
the evidence "in support of the verdict [or trial court findings] and then demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." ATK 
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Bf p. 7. From both a legal and policy standpoint, this position is absurd on its face. The 
Court must reject such an absurd notion. 
Regardless of the quantum of good faith that parties may believe they have, if they 
enter into an illegal agreement, the form of which is contrary to the Utah Constitution and 
statutory guidelines, such agreement must be declared void and unenforceable just as the 
tax exemption Agreement before this Court should be declared void and unenforceable. 
ATK asserts the only way to challenge its Agreement turns on a question of fact, 
i.e., whether the [Agreement] is unenforceable or void because of, inter alia, fraud, undue 
influence, mistake, or other such factors that could be a basis for invalidating any 
contract. ATK Brief p. 6. This false dilemma fallacy ignores the fimdamental illegality in 
the form of the Agreement which is at the heart of this appeal. The Agreement, which 
grants a partial property tax exemption not provided for in the Utah constitution, is 
without legal authority and thus repugnant to Utah law and sound public policy. 
B. Whether the Tax Court erred in determining that it had continuing 
jurisdiction over a failed or void agreement between the BOE and ATK to refund $5 
million in one lump sum payment for five years of litigation is a question of law, not 
fact 
In an equally misguided attempt to alter long established precedent over this 
Court's standard of review on matters of jurisdiction, ATK argues that "although 
jurisdiction is a question of law, the facts and circumstances supporting the Tax Court's 
exercise of jurisdiction are issues of fact." Thus, ATK continues, this Court must apply a 
substantial evidence standard for questions of fact and because appellants have not 
marshaled the evidence. ATK is correct when its states that subject matter jurisdiction 
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presents a question of law. See, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995). 
However, through an illogical extension, ATK must then argue that since all jurisdictional 
issues are dependent on facts and circumstances surrounding the exercise of that 
jurisdiction, all issues of jurisdiction must become questions of fact subject to review 
under a "substantial evidence" test. This extreme position is untenable. It lacks candor 
and would undo years of Court precedent. Consequently, it must be rejected. 
C Whether the Tax Court erred in holding Gardner was a "nominal" party to 
and bound by a failed or void agreement between the BOE and ATK to refund $5 
million in one lump sum payment as settlement of litigation is a question of law, not 
fact. 
The Tax Court's ruling that Gardner was a "nominal" party to the illegal 
Agreement between ATK and the BOE was a ruling as a matter of law, not fact. 
'"Nominal" is titular; existing in name only; not real or substantial; connected with the 
transaction or proceeding in name only, not in interest. [Black's Law Dictionary, 6th 
Edition, p. 1049]. To so conclude, the Tax Court literally had to ignore all of the 
following undisputed facts: (1) Gardner was deliberately kicked out of all settlement 
negotiations even though he was a party to the Independent Action [R. 1741]; (2) He 
actively opposed the form of the Agreement and the inequities it created by shifting the 
tax burden to other taxpayers [R. 1740]; (3) Gardner had no part in drafting any of its 
contents, his name appears nowhere on the Agreement, and he was listed as receiving a 
copy [R. 1740-1743, 1412]; (4) The phrase "assessor and assessors" was dropped by the 
BOE from the Agreement after it had been placed there by ATK in its prior 30 November 
2000 counteroffer to the BOE [R. 1708, 1412]; (5) ATK prepared and filed a Joint 
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Motion for Approval of the Settlement which expressly excluded the Assessor as a party 
to the Agreement [R.2664]; and (6) Even the BOE told the Tax Court the Assessor was 
not a party. [R. 2126, 2497]. 
The Tax Court ignored all of these undisputed facts. Next, the Tax Court had to 
interpret the phrase "Salt Lake County, its officers and officials" to mean the Assessor 
was a "nominal" party, even though the illegal Agreement was addressed to the BOE and 
to no one else; and even though this phrase was not material to the underlying purpose of 
the BOE and ATK and to the affirmative duties it sought to impose on these two parties. 
Finally, the Tax Court had to rule that the BOE had the authority to bind the Assessor, 
undisputedly a question of law. The court should review this issue as a matter of law 
under a correction of error standard. 
IL THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IS ILLEGAL AND VOID AS 
GRANTING A PARTIAL PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION BY 
REFUNDING $5 MILLION IN TAXES TO ATK WITHOUT STATUTORY 
AUTHORITY AND WITHOUT REFERENCE TO FAIR MARKET 
VALUATIONS. 
ATK makes a pivotal and key admission to this Court by acknowledging and 
agreeing that "the [Agreement] does not necessarily mandate that [ATK's] property is 
being valued and taxed at its fair market value under Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-301 and 
59-2-102 for each of the years in dispute." ATK Brf p. 22. Once again ATK concedes 
that its proposed Agreement with the BOE was not based on valuation. Gardner pointed 
out in its opening brief that ATK made this same concession before the Tax Court. In a 
responsive pleading to the Tax Court ATK acknowledged that the Agreement"... does 
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not achieve anyone's concept of fair market value for the years 1995 -1999 inclusive. 
Neither does the Settlement Agreement prospectively establish property values." 
(Emphasis added). [R.2591, Gardner Brf pp. 23-24 with Attachment 3]. 
The BOE has also conceded that the Agreement does not reflect fair market 
valuation. In an Affidavit filed by ATK before the Tax Court, Brent Overson, a County 
Commissioner and member of the BOE, reflects on his participation in the negotiations 
for settlement of the ad valorem taxes for ATK for 1995 through 1999 stating: 
(8) I made no reView of the appraisals as is defined in the Uniform 
Standards of Appraisal Practice. At no time did I state or recommend a 
valuation for the Alliant Techsystems property that was apart of the 
aforementioned discussions. (Emphasis added), [R. 1770]. 
Indeed, no where in the plain language of the Agreement do the parties attempt to 
comply with the constitutional mandate that all property, not otherwise exempt, be 
assessed in proportion to its value. As point of fact, the parties intentionally avoid any 
link to property valuation. The plain language of the Agreement supports this point as set 
forth below with comment by Gardner: 
The Board's offer of settlement is for tax years 1995 through 1999, 
inclusive, and is in the amount of $5 Million dollars [R. 1412]. 
Comment: Settlement was to be one single lump sum tax refund. This lump sum 
was to cover five years. No allocation between the years is mentioned* 
That settlement number includes all claims in all outstanding actions for 
those tax years involving real and personal property, NIROP and is 
inclusive of all interest, both that accruing prior the issuance of the 
judgments or orders and that accruing after the issuance of the judgments 
or orders through the date of final payment Id. 
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Comment: Settlement is based on a single number. It is not based on property 
values for real and personal property over five years. With a single number, ATK and the 
BOE seek to settle all issues for all property for all actions for all five years 
In proposing a settlement amount of $5 Million dollars, the Board 
specifically makes this a settlement in satisfaction of all disputed claims for 
the years 1995-1999 inclusive. No obsolescence percentage or amount will 
be applied to any particular year under appeal and any allocation of a 
reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation 
percentages only and shall be neither indicative nor dispositive with respect 
to any issue raised in AllianVs appeals. Specifically included within that 
category are claims as to excessive extraordinary functional obsolescence, 
economic or external obsolescence, environmental contamination and 
remediation, and any stigma associated therewith 
Comment: This specific language states the Agreement is to have nothing 
whatsoever to do with establishing fair market valuations. ATK and the BOE go to great 
lengths to distance themselves from any such reference. The language is clear and 
express. No functional, economic or external obsolescence is to be applied to any year for 
any property, real or personal. Nor is any issue on contamination, remediation or stigma 
resolved. Granting the refund resolves no issue or dispute between the parties. 
With respect to the personal property inclusion within the settlement 
amount, acceptance of the settlement shall include all issues which have 
been asserted with respect to personal property, including but not limited to 
existence or non-existence of items of property, extraordinary functional 
obsolescence economic or external obsolescence associated with 
production equipment and unresolved issues related to previously filed 
personal property affidavits by Alliant and audits performed by Salt Lake 
County. 
Comment: This language specifically focuses on personal property making 
sure the parties knew the tax refund was for personal as well as real property taxes. 
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It also states the settlement amount is to resolve all issues asserted to personal 
property but does not establish fair market valuations for personal property. 
The significance in making such point goes directly to the legal effect of the form 
of the settlement. Utah Const. Art. XIII Section 2(1) (1999) states: 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
Section 3(1) further provides 
The Legislature shall prescribe by laws such provisions as shall secure a 
just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and 
corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her or its 
tangible property,.. 
Thus, all tangible property not otherwise exempt, must be taxed at a uniform and equal 
rate according to its value so that every person pays their fair share of taxes. Without a 
determination of fair market value, there can be no equalization review by any authorized 
tribunal to ensure uniformity or equality in taxation. Because the parties agree to the form 
of the Agreement, and because ATK expressly acknowledges that the Agreement does not 
mandate fair market value, the BOE has effectively granted ATK a partial property tax 
exemption. Under the Utah constitution, all tangible property is either taxed at fair market 
value or exempted. The parties distance themselves from any determination of fair market 
value in this Agreement and instead agree to a single $5 Million dollar lump sum refund 
which amounts to a partial exemption. However, there is no constitutionally listed 
exemption for settling litigation. 
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Utah Const. Art. XIII Sec. 2(2) - 2(10) lists all exemptions allowed by law. The 
Legislature, acting within constitutional restraints, has further defined each exemption in 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1101 etseq. See, Judge v. Spencer, 48 P. 1097 (1897) 
(Legislature has no power to exempt from taxation property not exempt therefrom under 
Constitution). The justification expressed by ATK and the BOE for granting ATK an 
exemption is simply as settlement of disputed claims. ATK argues the risks of litigation 
are sufficient to justify the $5 million five year refund. However, the constitution lists no 
allowed exemption for settling disputed claims. Consequently, because the Agreement 
effectively grants ATK an exemption, and because there is no listed authority for that 
exemption, the actions of the BOE and ATK were illegal. Their Agreement must be 
declared void and unenforceable. 
A. The Agreement between ATK and the BOE deliberately rejects any 
determination of fair market value, thus rendering all of ATK's valuation 
arguments to this Court irrelevant* 
ATK's devotes numerous pages in its response brief in a struggle to justify 
and link its Agreement with the BOE to market valuation. See, ATK brief pp. 22-
29 and pp. 34-43. Yet ATK's analysis is contradicted by its own terms of 
settlement with the BOE and is inconsistent with its novel suggestion of universal 
application that county executives have absolute and unbridled authority to settle 
any litigation, in any way, at any time, for any reason. ATK's attempts to validate 
the Agreement based on market assessments are disingenuous. Moreover, they are 
irrelevant as ATK and the BOE deliberately disclaimed all reference to fair market 
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value. ATK told the Tax Court, the Agreement"... does not achieve anyone's 
concept of fair market value for the years 1995 - 1999. [R. 2591]. Commissioner 
Overson told the Tax Court "I made no review of the appraisals as is defined in the 
Uniform Standards of Appraisal Practice. At no time did I state or recommend a 
valuation for the Alliant Techsystems property that was apart of the 
aforementioned discussions" (Emphasis added) [R. 1770]. ATK can't have it both 
ways. It cannot state in an Agreement that market value doesn't matter and then 
argue to this Court that it does. 
ATK's argument that the Agreement is supported by the record through the 
use of anecdotal statements is also wholly inappropriate. How can this Court 
weight the merits and credibility of any anecdotal statement regarding value when 
there has been no evidentiary hearing, no due process or other necessary 
safeguards that follow from an evidentiary hearing. By presenting this unreliable 
information, ATK is indirectly asking the Court to take a position on the relative 
merits of the underlying valuation issues that still remain on appeal without a final 
judgment below. This entire exercise by ATK is frivolous and improper. 
Beginning on page 34, ATK asks this Court to find the Agreement legal, 
reasonable and supportable by reviewing information allegedly considered by the BOE 
when reaching the agreement. ATK cities to (1) prior adjudicated decisions, (2) 
statements from a single deposition, and (3) proposed appraisals. These arguments are 
patently frivolous, and at an even more fundamental level, ATK challenges well founded 
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and long established case law. ATK argues this Court should ignore the standard of proof 
required in all property tax assessment challenges to alter assessments. That standard of 
proof requires the moving party to show substantial error and a sound evidentiary basis 
for a lower value at an evidentiary hearing with due process consideration given to all 
parties, and without ever addressing the burden of proof necessary to alter an original 
assessment, See, Utah Power & Light Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm% 590 P.2d 332 (Utah 
1979) (where the taxpayer claims error, it has an obligation, not only to show substantial 
error or impropriety in the assessment, but also to provide a sound evidentiary basis upon 
which the Commission could adopt a lower valuation). Since there was no evidentiary 
hearing before the Tax Commission on the 1997-1999 administrative appeals, ATK 
apparently wants to argue that the mere review by county officials is adequate to alter 
assessments which flies in the face of well-established case law. See also, Utah Ry. Co. v. 
Utah Tax Comm% 5 P.3d 652, 655 (Utah 2000); Beaver County v. WUTel, Inc., 995 P.2d 
602, 606 (Utah 2000); Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm% 987 P.2d 594, 598 
(Utah 1999); Nelson v. Board of Equalization, 943 P.2d 1354, 1356 (Utah 1997); Alta 
Pac. Assocs. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103, 112 (Utah 1997); Beaver County 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 355 (Utah 1996). 
Prior adjudicated decisions 
On page 35, ATK begins a mind-numbing discussion of prior adjudicated 
decisions misusing broad averages and misleading statements, suggesting to this Court 
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that Gardner's assessments were unwarranted. 1 From the chart below, the truth is 
revealed demonstrating that Gardner's position during the evidentiary hearings 
substantially prevailed over that of ATK in every year and the Tax Commission soundly 
rejected ATK's position at the hearing. The Agreement to refund $5 million dollars places 
a burden of taxation on the shoulders of all other county taxpayers in the magnitude of 
500 percent or $4 million dollars more than indicated by prior decisions. 
PRIOR ADJUDICATED DECISIONS 
A B C D E (A-Cx.014) 
Years 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Gardner's 
Original 
Assessment 
168,801,600 
168,003,500 
256,402,900 
238,850,700 
235,848,900 
County 
BOE 
Values 
152,725,721 
168,003,500 
256,402,900 
238,850,700 
235,848,900 
Tax 
Commission 
Decisions 
152,725,721 
168,003,500 
215,210,000 
212,559,000 
232,650,000 
Kent/ Cook 
Appraisals2 
205,000,000 
208,140,000 
222,680,000 
217,650,000 
238,590,000 
ATK/Riley 
Appraisals3 
113,244,744 
109305,011 
114,265,195 
113,290,160 
134,520^83 
Refund 
Dollars 
@.014 rate 
$229,863 4 
$0 
$576,701 
$368,084 
$44,785 
TOTAL $989,570 
As compared to the Agreement refund of $5,000,000 
1 Incidentially, the Agreement between ATK and the BOE was created prior to the 1997 
through 1999 evidentiary hearing held in April 2000 where Gardner substantially 
prevailed before the Tax Commission. In the earlier administrative appeals for 1995 and 
1996, the Tax Commission had wholly sustained the BOE's values. Consequently, the 
only experience the BOE had before the Tax Commission ended in victory for the BOE 
which should raise at least an eyebrow over why Commissioners Overson and Shurtleff 
were so pessimistic. 
2 The 1995 value was submitted by Ed Kent, a commercial appraiser in the Assessor's 
office* 
3 Values submitted by ATK for Tax Commission evidentiary hearings. 
4 This is the actual refund paid in 1996 to ATK. Arguably, the $5 million dollar refiind 
should have been reduced or taken into consideration by the actual $229,863 that Salt 
Lake County refunded four (4) years earlier. 
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Deposition of Paul Ross 
ATK States that at the insistence of Gardner and the District Attorney, the BOE 
reviewed the depositions in the 1997 - 1999 consolidated appeals. If true, then ATK 
should have presented to this Court the substance of all depositions, not just one, and not 
just from an ATK employee. Instead ATK presents to this Court a jaded, unbalanced and 
incomplete view of information that may or may not have been reviewed by the county 
commissioners. There is no direct evidence in the record to support what county 
commissioners reviewed. However, it is reasonable to conclude that whatever information 
may have been considered by members of the BOE, it would have been reviewed by the 
Tax Commission during its evidentiary hearings and should be contained in the Tax 
Commission decisions from 1995 through 1999. In issuing its decisions, the Tax 
Commission had reviewed direct testimony of all witnesses, including Paul Ross, as well 
as cross examination, rebuttal testimony and closing arguments. After considering this 
information, the Tax Commission rejected ATK's position and ruled substantially in 
Gardner's favor, See Commission Decisions, Gardner's Initial Brf, Attachments 13 & 14. 
ATK discusses the deposition of Paul Ross to justify it excessive claim for 
obsolescence. ATK claimed a whopping 50 percent obsolescence adjustment! However, 
the Tax Commission found obsolescence to be substantially less and in 1999 at no 
economic obsolescence. See, Gardner's Initial Brf, Attachment 14. 
ATK asserts to this Court that "[t]he [BOE] clearly understood that lowering 
[ATK's] assessed values on real and personal property to justify a $5 million refund to 
16 
[ATK] was within the range of what the [BOE] and the Tax Commission had already 
decided on the basis of an evidentiary hearing, and the undisputed evidence the BOE 
reviewed." There is absolutely no evidence to support this statement. It is misleading and 
should be given no weight by the Court. 
Appraisals 
ATK asserts that this Court's role is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
BOE or reweigh evidence the BOE considered in negotiating and consummating the 
Agreement. Rather, it is to review issues of fact, (in this case the reasonableness of the 
Agreement) under a "substantial evidence" standard. And if there is any evidence to 
support the Agreement, it should affirm. ATK Brf, p. 41. The "evidence" ATK refers to 
in this statement consisting of appraisal information is purely anecdotal and unreliable 
since it lacks the indicia of reliability for the Court to even consider it. It was never 
testified to under oath, nor was it scrutinized with due process for reasonableness through 
cross examination and rebuttal testimony. Gardner is unaware of any case law and ATK 
has cited none that supports such an unsound position. 
ATK's appraisals and opinions of value were rejected by the Tax Commission. 
Their rejection came following an evidentiary hearing where appraisers testified under 
oath, were cross examined and subject to general due process concerns. The Tax 
Commission commented on them in its administrative decision. For example, on page 28 
of its decision, the Commission determines that "the amounts recommended by Mr. Reiliy 
[ATK's appraiser] [for obsolescence] are excessive and would not result in an accurate 
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representation of the fair market value of the property. Further on page 29, the 
Commission states "the use of 1984 to 1987 accordingly distorts [Reilly's] base period 
calculation." [R. 2426]. On page 30, the Commission states Mr. Reilly's calculations are 
"tainted" and "distorted by a $120,000,000 adjustment." Also, by failing to take into 
consideration the increase in the commercial satellite launch business, he [overstated] the 
amount of economic obsolescence. [R. 2426-2425]. The Tax Commission concludes its 
decision stating that Mr. Reilly's methodology clearly overstates economic obsolescence. 
[R. 2423]. 
Finally, ATK asserts that its Agreement with the BOE "expressly contemplated a 
reduction in value as one of several possible means for repayment." (Emphasis original). 
ATK Bf. p. 42. The plain language of the Agreement does state "any allocation of a 
reduction in value to any particular year shall be for refund calculation percentages 
only. " But then clarifies that such allocation "shall be neither indicative nor dispositive 
with respect to any issue raised in AllianVs appeals " thus rendering ATK's attempt to 
link the Agreement to market assessments totally irrelevant and without merit. ATK then 
asks this Court to affirm the Tax Court because it is "an adjustment of the Assessor's 
valuation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1002(3)." Such a statement is incredulous. It 
is patently untrue since the BOE never issued or even considered new valuation 
assessments. 
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ID. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY CHECKS AND BALANCES ARE 
VITAL TO MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE'S 
PROPERTY TAX SYSTEM AND ENSURING UNIFORMITY AND 
EQUALITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE BURDEN OF TAXATION. 
ATK readily concedes that its agreement to settle with the BOE through a lump 
sum refund of $5 million dollars was not based on any determination of fair market value. 
ATK Brf p. 22. Rather, ATK argues that the risks of litigation coupled with the general 
authority of county officers to settle litigation provide sufficient justification for the Court 
to conclude that its Agreement with the BOE is legal, enforceable and constitutional. 
ATK Brf. pp. 20 - 21. ATK argues that it was not necessary to settle based on fan-
market value giving rise to what amounts to as a partial property tax exemption. While 
Gardner absolutely supports the public policy which strongly favors settlement over 
litigation, and has, in fact, settled numerous cases based on a determination of fair market 
value over the terms of his office, no policy which favors settlement can override or 
"trump" constitutional and statutory mandates requiring uniformity and equality in 
taxation. Parties cannot enter into illegal agreements. It is important to note that property 
settlements routinely occur that are not offensive to these foundational principles. 
Furthermore, these settlements occur constantly between taxpayers and taxing officials 
acting within the scope of their authority and duties. And they occur at all stages of 
litigation - from actions pending before county boards of equalization to actions before 
the State Tax Commission and authorized Tax Courts. Understanding and maintaining 
the unique roles of taxing officers becomes key to how settlements can and should be 
fashioned. 
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A. Uniformity and equality in property taxation require that all property be 
justly assessed at fair market value so that all taxpayers pay a proportionate tax. 
The fundamental policy that should concern and govern this Court's analysis 
emanates from Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution. 
All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United 
States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
in proportion to its value. 
The Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just 
valuation for taxation of such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for 
taxation of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a 
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property. 
(Emphasis Added). See, Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984) 
(The overarching purpose of §§ 2 and 3 of Article XIII is to achieve uniformity in the ad 
valorem taxing scheme); Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 324 (Utah 1997) 
(While absolute equality and uniformity in the assessment of property is not practicable, a 
requirement of reasonable uniformity and equality is essential); Alta Pac. Assocs. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 931 P.2d 103 (Utah 1997) (The object of such uniformity and 
equality is so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value 
of his, her, or its tangible property); Nelson v. Board of Equalization, 943 P.2d 
1354 (Utah 1997) (AH tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, unless 
otherwise provided by law). 
Early in the State's history, this Court eloquently articulated the application of 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah constitution and policy surrounding the 
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system of property taxation. Cited frequently in subsequent decision, this Court stated in 
State ex rel Cunningham v. Thomas, 50 P 615 (Utah 1897): 
The provisions of the constitution, so far as material to the decision of this 
case, are as follows: In section 2 of article 13 it is provided that "all 
property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the United States, or 
under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be 
ascertained as provided by law." Under this provision all taxable property 
must be assessed and taxed "in proportion to its value." It will be noticed 
that "value" is here referred to in a comparative manner, and is to be 
"ascertained as provided by law." The word "proportion" doubtless has 
reference to sameness or likeness in value of property; that is, all property 
must be taxed at the same relative value... .The real intent, however, of the 
framers of the constitution, is made more manifest in section 3 of article 13, 
which contains this language: The legislature shall provide by law a 
uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation on all property in the 
state, according to its value in money, and shall prescribe by general law 
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property; 
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the 
value of his, her, or its property." This provision is closely related to the 
one in section 2, and directs the legislature not only to provide a uniform 
and equal rate of assessment and taxation, so that every subject owning 
property shall pay the same rate of tax as every other such subject, but also 
declares that all property shall be assessed at a basis which shall be 
"according to its value in money." It is evident that the term "according to 
its value in money" means that all property shall be valued, for the purposes 
of assessment, as near as is reasonably practicable at its full cash value; in 
other words, that the valuation for assessment and taxation shall be, as near 
as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which the property 
valued would sell in open market, for this is doubtless the correct test of the 
value of property. The manifest intention is that all taxable property shall 
bear its just proportion of the burdens of taxation. These two sections of the 
constitution harmonize with each other; and, by reading and considering 
them together, it becomes clear that all taxable property within this state 
must be assessed and taxed on a valuation fixed at its actual cash value, or 
as near such value as is reasonably practicable. 
Respecting the proper roles of taxing officials, the Cunningham Court fiirther 
noted: 
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In order, it would seem, to guard against unjust valuations which might 
result from whatever cause, and to secure greater uniformity and equality in 
taxation, it was provided in section 11 of the same article as follows: "Until 
otherwise provided by law, there shall be a state board of equalization, 
consisting of the governor, state auditor, state treasurer, secretary of state, 
and attorney general; also, in each county in this state, a county board of 
equalization, consisting of the board of county commissioners of said 
county. The duty of the state board of equalization shall be to adjust and 
equalize the valuation of the real and personal property among the several 
counties of the state. The duty of the county board of equalization shall be 
to adjust and equalize the valuation of the real and personal property within 
their respective counties. Each board shall also perform such other duties as 
may be prescribed by law." By this section are created the state and county 
boards of equalization, and their duties defined. 
Since Cunningham, the makeup of the state board of equalization has been 
replaced with the State Tax Commission, but its purpose "to guard against unjust 
valuations which might result from whatever cause, and to secure greater 
uniformity and equality in taxation" has remained constant and unvarying. 
1. Sound public policy encourages settlement of property tax disputes that 
conform to constitutional standards of uniformity and equality. 
Throughout its reply brief, ATK blatantly misrepresents Gardner's position on 
settling tax disputes. For example, arguing from the flawed logic of the slippery slope 
fallacy, ATK reaches the absurd conclusion that if Gardner and Granite prevail, no one 
would ever settle. ATK Brf. p. 49. ATK also states that if the Appellants are correct, 
settlement and mediation of property tax cases is illegal and unconstitutional. ATK Bf. p. 
23. Part of ATK9 s confusion on this point may be in its imprecise understanding and use 
of the term "compromise" in a property tax setting. 
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Compromise and settlement is defined as the settlement of a disputed claim by 
mutual concession to avoid a lawsuit. Black's Law Diet. Sixth Edition, p. 287. Within the 
property tax context, disputes generally center on either a determination of "fair market 
value," or the application of an exemption. Compromise on matters of valuation does not 
mean that the parties "compromise" value to something other than fair market value. 
Rather, by mutual concession, the parties will concede positions on appraisal points 
which may either raise or lower their initial opinions of value until they reach and agree 
on "fair market value." This type of compromise routinely occurs dozens, if not hundreds 
of time throughout all counties of the state every year. Gardner routinely "settles" when 
prudence dictates. Market value is a factual determination based on generally accepted 
appraisal practices. By its very nature, it is an imprecise determination based on opinion. 
One court states 
"Valuation is an art, not a science. It is a function of judgment, not of 
natural law . . . . For example—true market value for purposes of ad valorem 
taxation is always an estimate, always an expression of judgment, always a 
result built on a foundation of suppositions about knowledgeable and 
willing buyers and sellers endowed with money and desire, whose desires 
are said to converge in a dollar description of the asset. 
Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm% 716 F. Supp. 543, 554 (D. Utah 1988). 
Another aspect of ATK's confusion may be the nature of compromise in single 
year property tax disputes versus multiple years. While not necessarily constitutionally 
sound, but as a practical matter, single year settlements of value sometimes first originate 
from a desired tax reduction. Mathematically, a reduction in taxes is directly proportional 
to a reduction in value. The formula for property taxes is "value x tax rate." The 
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mathematical derivative for value is "taxes / tax rate." Thus while a reduction in taxes 
may drive such a settlement, the settlement can still be based on "fair market value" thus 
maintaining the integrity and application of constitutional and statutory principles of 
uniformity and equality. 
Whether fair market value is established by agreement of all affected parties 
through negotiations or compromise or whether fair market value is established through 
findings of an authorized tribunal after an orderly evidentiary hearing considering 
credible market based information, the end result must always be the same - fair market 
value. Utah Const. Art XIII, Sections 2 and 3 require a finding that property is assessed 
in proportion to its value and is uniform and equal with all other taxpayer property. 
Anything less is unconstitutional. 
This "practical" aspect of single year property tax settlements however does not 
exist for multiple year settlements as is the case at hand. With two or more years at stake, 
"backing" into value becomes increasingly difficult. Fair market value must be 
determined as of 1 January of each year. And each year stands on its own because a 
taxpayer may acquire or lose property assets each year or the forces of supply and demand 
which sets value will fluctuate each year. Thus, in a five year property tax settlement, it is 
literally impossible to "back" into values based on mere tax reductions. In the case at 
hand, the actions of ATK and the BOE are even more egregious not only because the 
settlement is for a single lump sum covering five tax years, but because ATK and the 
BOE specifically wanted nothing to do with even reaching fair market value as previously 
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noted. That is why this Court must declare the Agreement illegal, unenforceable and 
unconstitutional. 
ATK tells this Court that public policy favors settlement in absence of impropriety. 
ATK Brf. p. 21. Gardner absolutely agrees - but only "in the absence of impropriety." 
As noted above, settlements should be encouraged. On the other hand, illegal settlements 
cannot be encouraged, but must be discouraged as contrary to public policy. Such policy 
clearly rejects illegal agreements similar to the Agreement at hand. 
Besides violating the Utah constitution, ATK's attempt to settle its dispute for 
taxes only has done nothing to resolve litigation in the long run. Valuation disputes that 
are merely put off for expedience with the promise to fight again at a later day may not 
promote the public interest. A strong argument can be made that actually favors resolving 
valuation disputes through & final evidentiary proceeding because resolution of valuation 
methodology actually promotes long range resolutions that prevent multiple further 
litigations as many Supreme Court cases testify. The term "finaF evidentiary proceeding 
is used because all parties to an appeal have multiple "bites" at the apple ranging from 
administrative proceedings before county boards and the Tax Commission to trial de novo 
proceedings in Tax Court. 
There is another important aspect to settlements that must be noted. All valuation 
settlements must pass at least some reasonable degree of scrutiny. That is, they must be 
found or determined to be reasonable determinations of value on their face. It is on this 
point that the State Tax Commission, county boards of equalization and assessors come 
25 
into play. These three entities form critical checks and balances in the property tax system 
that "guard against unjust valuations which might result from whatever cause, and to 
secure greater uniformity and equality in taxation" as expressed above by the 
Cunningham Court. For example, the parties could not come together and agree to settle 
by setting the value at zero. Such compromise is a de facto exemption and would clearly 
be contrary to law> illegal and void. There must be a rational basis for the valuation. That 
is why state and local boards of equalization are established. And that is also why 
assessors have been given the authority and duty to function as it were, as watch dogs 
maintaining the right to judicially challenge the conclusions of either or both local and 
state boards of equalization. 
2. The Assessor's assessment duties and rights to appeal provide an 
important check to help maintain the integrity of the property tax system. 
ATK states that neither Gardner nor Granite have veto power over the BOE 
decision to settle, which it suggests is consonant with the board's power to equalize 
property so that all taxpayers fairly and equitably assessed. ATK Bf p. 23. ATK's 
imprecise use of "veto" is curious and misleading. No - Gardner does not have veto 
power for any purpose. In legal parlance, veto is the refusal of assent by the executive 
officer whose assent is necessary to perfect a law which has been passed by the legislative 
body. Black's Law Diet. Sixth Edition, p. 1564. Presumably ATK meant to argue that 
Gardner does not have the right to appeal or "challenge" the BOE's attempts to settle, 
whether legitimate or illegitimate, unless perhaps ATK is saying that Assessor has right to 
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challenge equalization setting value, but when the BOE skirts valuation altogether, the 
Assessor loses the right to challenge the BOE action. Either interpretation, however, is 
erroneous as a matter of law. ATK's position appears to be a deliberate attempt to 
circumvent the Gardner's right to appeal on the basis of value. Then to further this 
attempt, asserts Gardner is a party to the agreement. 
The right to challenge the actions of the BOE was firmly established in Kimball 
Condos Owners Assfn v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 943 P.2d 642 
(Utah 1997). This Court pointed out t^ iat "if the assessor had no right of appeal from 
board of equalization decisions, many decisions would be insulated from review 
altogether.55 The Assessor serves an important role in the checks and balances that 
maintain uniformity and equality. After all, there is no other authority at the local level 
that has the duty to assess all county properties. Only the assessor is intimately familiar 
with the values and methodologies used to value all local property. Uniformity and 
equality in the property tax assessment process begins with the original assessments. 
Consequently, the assessor becomes the initial "equalizer55 trying to measure the market 
value of all local properties. It makes sense that the assessor would have the right to 
challenge the actions of the BOE or Tax Commission if the assessor has substantial 
evidence that challenges their equalization conclusions. 
ATK does make an important concession by agreeing that Gardner has the duty to 
assess as well as the right to intervene in BOE appeals. ATK Bf. p. 22. However, 
whether intentional or inadvertent, ATK fails to cite or recognize the principle of law and 
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sound public policy set forth in Kimball Condos Owners Ass'n. A clear inference from 
ATK's concessions is the duty of Gardner to intervene in these valuation appeals (1995-
1996 and 1997 - 1999). Of course Gardner was a de facto party in the Independent action 
before the Tax Court. And as a practical matter, Gardner and the Assessor's office were 
active participants in the 1995-1996 appeals before Tax Commission. Gardner supervised 
the litigation for the 1997-1999 administrative evidentiary hearings before the Tax 
Commission in April, 2001. 
As an aside, had ATK and BOE "settled" at the county equalization hearing, the 
assessor clearly could have appealed under Kimball Condos Owners Ass'n. What is the 
difference here? ATK must think that power to settle eviscerates any right the assessor 
has to appeal, thus effectively inferring that if BOE determines value based on evidentiary 
findings, Gardner can appeal. On the other hand, if the BOE settles, there can be no 
appeal or challenge. Such a position is nonsensical and logically flawed and contrary to 
public policy recognized in Kimball Condos Owners Assfn. 
Under the position taken by ATK, the actions of ATK and BOE, legitimate or not, 
would go unchecked resulting in inequities and fundamental unfairness to all other 
taxpayers who end up bearing the brunt of a tax shift. In the case at hand, the BOE 
agreed to a $5 million tax refund. But why stop at $5 million? Why not agree to a $7 
million or even a $10 million refund. ATK's argument that there was a sound evidentiary 
basis for the refund and its flawed theory on settlement would also have arguably 
supported a settlement of up to $11 million. In the extreme, ATK's position that Gardner 
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had no authority to challenge the actions of the BOE and that they had unchecked plenary 
authority to do whatever they wanted could mean that ATK might have even entered into 
an agreement with the BOE that fully exempted ATK's property. Of course such a notion 
is absurd - as is the intimation that Gardner had no right to become involved. 
Speaking of the relative roles of the assessor and boards of equalization, ATK 
attempts to disparage the assessor's position in this appeal stating that there is no 
constitutional authority that Gardner's view of fair market value prevails over that of the 
BOE. ATK Bf. p. 22. This statement has no application in the context of this appeal 
again because the BOE never considered fair market value. On its face, the statement is 
nonsensical, because when challenged, the final determination of any litigated value rests 
with neither the assessor nor the board of equalization but rather the tribunals of the Tax 
Commission or Tax Court after presentation of sufficiently credible and compelling 
market based evidence to show why the original value is erroneous and providing a sound 
evidentiary basis for a lower value. See, Utah Power & Light Co, 590 P.2d at 335. Boards 
of equalization do have the right to affirm, reverse or modify an original assessment, but 
county assessors have the right to challenge those decisions when they have sufficient 
evidence to believe the board's assessment fails to meet the constitutional standard of fair 
market value. 
3. County board's of equalization also serve an important role in 
maintaining the integrity of property taxation, but their duties and 
responsibilities are limited by the Utah constitution and statutes. 
Another point on which Gardner and ATK clearly agree is that board's of 
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equalization have a duty to ensure that property is assessed at fair market value under the 
Utah Constitution and statutory law. ATK Bf pp. 22-24. Where the parties disagree is that 
Gardner believes this duty requires the BOE to resolve evidentiary hearings and 
settlements with clear and direct supportable reference to fair market assessments. ATK 
on the other hand believes that notwithstanding this duty, the BOE can settle without 
reference to fair market value and without any intent to reach fair market value by 
steadfastly defending an illegal agreement that avoids value and attempts to compromise 
on taxes. This Court must ask the question as to how the BOE could have met its 
constitutional duty when its Agreement expressly ignores fair market value. 
ATK cites to Logan City v. Allen, 44 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1935) as a Utah case 
"directly on point" for the right to compromise taxes. ATK Bf. p. 24. However, within 
only a few sentences of its analysis, ATK concedes that the issue and nature of the action 
in Logan City are different than the case at hand. Importantly, ATK completely ignores 
the relevant principle of law cited by the Supreme Court in Logan City with direct 
application to the case at hand. That general principle states that "the taxing officers of 
state, county or a municipal corporation may not compromise or release claims for taxes 
legally assessed unless empowered to do so by statute. " (Emphasis added). Logan, 44 
P.2d 1085, 1087. This principle is founded on sound public policy and the constitutional 
principles of uniformity and equality. ATK fails to mention let alone attempt to 
distinguish application of this fundamental principle of law to this case. Its application 
delivers a death blow to ATK's position. 
30 
In Logan City, the William Budge Memorial Hospital made an offer to the board 
of county commissioners of Cache county to settle its delinquent taxes for the years 1929, 
1930, and 1931 on the basis of the assessed value of its property as assessed for the 1932 
tax. The board accepted the offer and referred it to the State Tax Commission for 
approval. The Tax Commission affirmed the settlement on the fact that although the legal 
effect of amendments to the hospital's articles of incorporation had not been definitely 
decided by the courts, the Tax Commission viewed the amendment as giving the hospital 
the character of a charitable organization, although the question was not "free from 
doubt" and would require further litigation to settle the controversy. The Tax Commission 
concluded that it would be for the best interest of the state and county to approve the offer 
and accept payment of the taxes without interest, penalties, or costs as proposed. Logan 
City challenged the settlement and sought personal judgments against county and state 
officials. 
Upon review, the Supreme Court noted that if the county commissioner and tax 
commission officers acted within authority, it was because of the provisions section 6054, 
Comp. Laws Utah 1917, as amended by chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1931, p. 234 which 
provided: 
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"In case property is sold to the county as purchaser pursuant to the 
provisions of law, and is subsequently assessed, no person shall be 
permitted to redeem from such sale except upon payment also of the amount 
of such subsequent assessment, interest, penalty and costs, unless in cases 
involving $ 250.00 or less, in the judgment of the county commissioners 
and in all other cases in the joint judgment of the county commissioners and 
of the State tax commission, the interest of the state and the county will be 
subserved by accepting a less sum than the amount due for taxes, interest, 
penalty, and costs." 
Importantly, there are three distinguishing facts in Logan City which are not 
present in the current record before the Court. First, the proposed "compromise" was 
based on "assessed value" and not merely on a refund of taxes as in the present case. 
Second, approval was based on the general authority of a statute which authorized 
compromise where "the interest of the state and county will be subserved." There is no 
statute which authorizes ATK and the BOE to compromise property taxes. And third, the 
Tax Commission's approval was based on the Hospital's character as a charitable 
organization, one of the listed constitutional exemptions. Here, there is no constitutional 
provision granting an exemption for ATK on the basis of risk of litigation. 
ATK suggests that Logan City stands for the proposition there is no constitutional 
impediment to the compromise and settlement of tax cases. Logan City clearly does not 
stand for that proposition and is distinguished from the case at hand based upon the 
differences noted above. But as a practical matter, Gardner does not disagree that 
property tax disputes can be settled. So long as settlements do not offend constitutional 
and statutory guidelines, they are clearly appropriate. 
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Finally, ATK asserts that Logan City is consonant with other cases affirming 
settlements, citing to Millard County v Utah StateTax Comm % 823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1990) 
and Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Comm 'n, 856 P.2d 
601 (Utah 1983). But neither case provides the Court with any persuasive authority for 
application to the current record. Millard County, a sales tax case, was reviewed by this 
Court based on statutes and constitutional principle consistent with sales tax that have no 
application to property taxation. Administrative Services has nothing to do with taxation 
and has no constitutional or statutory application to the facts at hand. 
From a discussion of Logan City relating the lack of constitutional prohibition on 
property tax settlement, ATK illogically leaps to a discussion of the fundamental 
contractual principle contained in Bair v. Lay ton City Corp. 307 P.2d 895 (Utah 1957) 
that governmental bodies in the exercise of governmental or legislative power cannot 
make a contract which is binding on the municipality after the end of such governing 
body's term of office. 
Gardner cited Bair for the proposition that the BOE had no authority to bind the 
legislative body of the new Salt Lake County Mayor - Council optional form of 
government which began January of 2001 into refunding $5 million property tax dollars. 
ATK apparently concedes in the validity of the underlying principle, but contends that 
"breaching contracts settling litigation is not a governmental function. Nor does 
settlement of past actions bind successor government to future actions." ATK also claims 
that the Agreement disavows any intent to bind the BOE or any County officer in the 
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performance of any future governmental function. ATK's conclusions are wholly without 
merit. 
There is no more fundamental government function than taxation. Can there be any 
dispute that the Agreement between ATK and the BOE to refund $5 million dollars in 
property taxes does not relate to a fundamental governmental function? Obviously 
attempting to misfocus the Court from the content of the Agreement, ATK flippantly 
states that "breaching contracts settling litigation is not a governmental function." Such 
an absurd statement does not merit a response. In substance, the Agreement purports to 
bind a successor government, i.e., the new Salt Lake County Mayor-Council, by forcing it 
to illegally refund in the future tax revenues either from reserves or through a judgment 
levy. The Agreement was not a judgment. It was a contract to perform a future act 
purportedly upon consideration based on past litigation. To that end, the Agreement 
between ATK and BOE sought to bind a future governing body in the exercise of a 
governmental function, contrary to law. 
Based on a misguided characterization that begs the question of the Court over the 
illegality of ATK's actions, ATK throws out a meaningless challenge to find any case law 
holding that a government may repudiate a good faith contract in litigation for past, not 
fixture acts. The point is, the BOE's Agreement with ATK was illegal and contrary to 
sound public policy. 
ATK states that achieving "fair market value" is subordinate to the BOE's duty to 
equalize assessments so that all taxpayers, including ATK are treated equitably and fair. 
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ATK Bf. p. 23. While the general principles referenced by ATK as articulated in Harmer 
v. State Tax Comm 'n 452 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1969) and Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan 
County, 681 P.2d 184,194 (Utah 1984) are sound, they have no application to this case 
because the BOE never mentioned let alone equalized values. This failure to reference 
and equalize values is a fatal defect in the Agreement. Equalization is the act or process 
of making equal or bringing about conformity to a common standard. Black's Law Diet. 
Sixth Edition, p. 536. The BOE did equalize. It established no value. 
ATK also argues that under Utah case law and unspecified principles of 
administrative law, the BOE and county commission ("BOC") have the right to evaluate 
litigation risks and choose or compromise between conflicting appraisals as "the [BOE] 
and [BOC] did in this case." ATK Bf. p. 24. The flaw with this last assertion is that it 
misrepresents what the BOE and BOC actually did. The BOE who negotiated the 
Agreement did not choose or compromise between competing appraisals, because their 
Agreement to settle with ATK intentionally avoided having anything to do with value. 
4. Gardner asks the Court to strike ATK's argument regarding its 
application of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(1) because the issue was never 
raised below. Moreover, ATK's unrestricted interpretation and application 
of section 17-53-315(1) is erroneous. 
ATK begins its reply brief by arguing that Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315(1) is 
controlling and provides the statutory authority to justify ATK's illegal Agreement with 
the BOE. ATK Bf. p. 3. Gardner has reviewed the record below and could find no where 
that this section was presented to or argued before the Tax Court or the Tax Commission. 
It is not contained anywhere in the Tax Court's final decision and order. In fact, the Tax 
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Court actually refers to the Salt Lake County Commission as a legislative rather than 
executive body with authority to resolve lawsuits during pending litigation thus 
contradicting ATK's statement that the Tax Court's holding is consistent with and 
supported by Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315. ATK Bf p. 21. Because this issue is now 
raised for the first time on appeal, Gardner moves this Court to strike it.5 
As pointed out earlier, this appeal does not pivot on the authority to settle. Rather, 
it is a challenge to the illegal form of the Agreement between ATK and the BOE. Unless 
ATK can find case law to the contrary, which none exists, it can be duly noted by this 
Court that no governing authority has the right or power to enter into an illegal 
agreement. Such agreements clearly violate sound public policy. Thus, section 17-53-
315(1) does not control and does not provide the safe harbor ATK seeks to justify its 
illegal Agreement. It does not give the county executive unbridled discretion and 
authority to settle. Its authority is clearly limited by the Utah constitution and by the 
principles discussed above in Logan City (taxing officers of state, county or a municipal 
corporation may not compromise or release claims for taxes legally assessed unless 
empowered to do so by statute). 
In asserting that section 17-53-315(1) provides "plenary" or absolute authority for 
settling any lawsuit, ATK creates a separation of powers conflict and logical absurdity 
which may now arise with optional forms of county government which separate executive 
5 Gardner finds it hypocritical that ATK would issue a preemptory challenge that 
Appellant's cannot challenge the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 17-53-315 in a 
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and legislative functions. The county legislative body is the county board of equalization. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001(1). Its duties and powers are constitutional and statutory. 
Under ATK's argument, if the county executive has absolute authority to settle any 
lawsuit "or other action" there is no legal impediment for the Salt Lake County Mayor to 
walk into a county board of equalization hearing, a legislative function, and close the 
hearing and settle the disputed matter since under ATK's broad view of the world, a 
county board of equalization hearing is an "action." Under fundamental separation of 
powers principles, a county executive does not have authority to usurp the duties and 
functions of a county legislative body. Confusion by the Tax Court and others led to the 
characterization of "ratified/approved" when referring to the actions of the Salt Lake 
County Commissioners on 6 December 2000 concerning the illegal Agreement. 
5, There is no basis for an award of Attorney fees against Gardner. 
ATK claims that a determination of an award of attorney fees in this case presents 
a question of fact. ATK Bf. p. 9. However, it completely ignores the fundamental 
question which Gardner has raised which conclusively resolves the matter for Gardner 
and against an award of fees. That is, whether the BOE or the County Commission had 
the authority to bind the assessor in a matter over which he had a statutory duty. The facts 
are not in dispute. There is no question that Gardner was kicked out of negotiations, that 
he opposed the Agreement, that the BOE said he was not a party and that the pleadings by 
all parties, including ATK, implicitly or expressly noted Gardner was not a party. The 
reply because the issue was not raised in Appellant's initial brief. ATK Bf. p. 4* 
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sole basis for the Tax Court concluding that that Gardner was a "nominal" party was the 
phrase "Salt Lake County, its officers and attorneys." However for the reasons noted in 
Gardner's opening brief and herein, the BOE and County Commission did not have 
authority to bind Gardner. 
ATK claims that the County District Deputy Attorney was representing Gardner's 
interests when he signed the Agreement that included the phrase "Salt Lake County, its 
officers and attorneys." ATK Bf. pp. 70-71. However, Karl Hendrickson could not 
represent Gardner during the negotiations and drafting of the Agreement because his two 
clients had a conflict of interest. Rule 1.7 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
governing conflicts of interest strictly prohibits such representation. The conflict of 
interest occurred during the time that Gardner was barred from settlement discussions and 
actively opposed the Agreement up to and including the hearing on 6 December 2000 and 
thereafter. This conflict of interest was why Gardner retained separate counsel. Thus 
Hendrickson could not bind the assessor. This may be one of the reasons why the terms 
"assessor" and "assessors" were deleted from the final draft offer dated 5 December 
2000. 
The BOE and County Commissioners were also barred statutorily from binding 
Gardner for the reason argued below by the BOE to the Tax Court. [R. 2185]. Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-53-106 (2001) provides that 
A county legislative body and a county executive . . . may not direct or 
supervise other elected county officers or their sworn deputies with respect 
to the performance of the professional duties of the officers or deputies. 
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While enacted after 2000, Gardner contends this language codified existing statutory roles 
of the various county officers. The principle behind the plain language of section 17-53-
106(2)(a) prohibited the County Commissioners from binding Gardner. 
Finally, while also not enacted until 31 April 2001, Gardner notes that Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-53-315(2) limits section 315(1) stating that "if a lawsuit or other action is 
brought or prosecuted by another elected official or a board or other entity of the county 
under a statutory duty, that other elected official, board or other entity may control and 
direct the lawsuit or other action, consistent with applicable law." Gardner argues that 
such a principle of law also codified existing relationships among various county officials 
and operates as yet a further reason why the Court should reject and overrule the award of 
attorney fees. 
IV. THE TAX COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THE AGREEMENT 
A. The Tax Commission's failure to approve the Agreement violated a condition 
precedent in the Agreement rendering the Agreement void and unenforceable and 
the Tax Court without jurisdiction. 
ATK contends that the approval of the Tax Commission required by the 
Agreement is not fatal to its enforceability because it was merely "jurisdictional" and not 
a condition precedent. However, the Tax Court disagreed. In its final decision, the Tax 
Court found that "[t]he Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon the approval of the 
Tax Commission and this Court. [R. 2875]. In truth, the plain language of the Agreement 
is clear and undeniable. It dictates "[t]his settlement proposal is subject [conditional] to ... 
final approval by the Utah State Tax Commission." ATK suggests without authority that 
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mere "acknowledging jurisdictional prerequisites in the Settlement Agreement does not 
transform them to conditions precedent to the agreement's validity." ATK Bf p.44. Such 
a statement is absurd on its face and belies the plain language of the parties. If the 
Agreement is subject to Tax Commission approval, then it is conditioned on Tax 
Commission approval. Whether conditioned on the approval of a tribunal or not, it is a 
condition nonetheless. Of course ATK has to take such an extreme position else its later 
argument giving the Tax Court jurisdiction utterly fails. 
ATK tries to further its flawed logic stating that the Tax Commission was not a 
party to Agreement. Indeed, it was not. But the Tax Commission was a party to two of the 
three proceedings below. It was a named defendant in the 1995-1996 Tax Court appeals 
and had directly intervened in the Independent Action. Thus, it had full rights as a party in 
interest to approve or reject the Agreement. It chose to reject the Agreement. As point of 
fact, Gardner as well was a named party to the Independent Action and should have had 
an independent right to approve or reject the Agreement. [R. 2880-2881]. Lawsuits are 
not fully settled without resolving the rights and interests of all parties to the action. The 
Tax Court's ruling validating the Agreement directly impacted the Tax Commission's 
rights as a party in both the 1995-1996 appeals and Independent Action. 
B. The Tax Court lost jurisdiction over personal property appeals and that 
portion of the Agreement that sought to refund taxes on personal property. 
In response to Gardner's claim that ATK violated the Agreement and altered 
consideration by dismissing its personal property appeals in a desperate attempt to salvage 
its rejected illegal Agreement, ATK claims that it dismissed the appeals because it was 
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under obligation to do so by the Agreement. ATK Bf. pp. 56-57 ATK's response is 
embarrassingly disingenuous. The plain language of the Agreement states that the $5 
million refund is for "all outstanding actions involving real and personal property." The 
Agreement specifically states "[w]ith respect to the personal property inclusion within 
the settlement amount, acceptance of the settlement shall include all issues which have 
been asserted with respect to personal property, including ..." (Emphasis added). [R. 
1412]. This language clearly shows that the $5 million refund was to include a refund 
amount for personal property appeals. 
By dismissing the personal property appeals ATK deprived the Tax Court of any 
jurisdiction over personal property tax refunds. They are now permanently "off the table." 
A reduction in personal property assessment values is also forever beyond the reach of 
ATK. In its haste to salvage the Agreement that had been properly rejected by both the 
Tax Commission and the Tax Court, ATK altered the entire settlement landscape at the 
Tax Court level. ATK now wants to have an "original and independent" review under 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2) of an Agreement to refund real and personal property 
taxes, but the Tax Court has no jurisdiction over the personal property taxes. ATK 
dismissed those appeals outright. Clearly, the parties to the Agreement intended that the 
$5 million refund was to include a refund of personal property taxes. ATK's counteroffer 
to the BOE dated 30 November 2000 is proof certain on this point where the settlement 
offer went from $4.5 million for real property to $5 million for real and personal property. 
[R. 1708]. Consequently, the Tax Court's ruling validating the Agreement and ordering a 
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refund of taxes that include personal property taxes where there are no pending personal 
property tax appeals was clearly ultra vires, beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court. Its ruling that the Agreement is valid must be reversed by this Court. 
V. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE THE TAX COMMISSION'S 
INVITATION TO ISSUE A RULING FOR A HYPOTHETICAL 
SCENARIO. 
The Tax Commission filed a brief raising two issues. First, The Tax Commission 
asks this Court to provide clear guidance on how property tax settlements, especially 
those involving multiple years, are tested against the Utah Constitution's fair market 
value standard. Tax Commission Bf. p. 6. The Tax Commission urges the Court to apply 
the same procedures discussed in Beaver County v. Tax Comm %9\6 P.2d 344 (Utah 
1996). Secondly, the Tax Commission asks the Court to limit its opinion in this matter to 
issues related to the settlement. The Commission disputes, as does Gardner, the Tax 
Court's jurisdiction over the Independent Action. 
Gardner objects to the Tax Commission's first request. The Tax Commission seeks 
a judicially imposed procedure similar to that used in Beaver County v. Tax Comm X 916 
P.2d 344 (Utah 1996) for resolving property tax settlements. The stated purpose is to 
ensure that the constitutional standard of fair market value is met in property tax 
settlements, especially those involving multiple years. While Gardner fiilly agrees that the 
constitutional standard of fair market value must be met in property tax settlements, he 
respectfully asks this Court to decline the Commission's invitation. There is no need to 
address this issue because it has no application to this appeal. The Tax Commission asks 
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the Court to rule on a hypothetical scenario - one where there was a settlement of fair 
market value assessment for multiple years. The Agreement between ATK and the BOE 
did not address fair market value. It never stated values. Their Agreement amounts to an 
illegal partial exemption of ATK's property. Thus the Court's effort would have no 
present application. Moreover, the ruling in Beaver County was based in part on reference 
to a statute that has application only in state assessed property appeals and not locally 
assessed appeals. See, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1007(4). Also, given the Commission's 
constitutional duty to supervise and administer the tax laws, the Tax Commission might 
analyze the issue, solicit public comment and recommend such a procedure to the 
legislature where full public debate could take place The Court should decline the 
Commission's invitation. 
On the second issue, Gardner joins with the Tax Commission and asks this Court 
to limit its opinion to the settlement Agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Agreement between ATK and the BOE was an illegal attempt to grant a 
partial property tax exemption to ATK contrary to Utah law and sound public policy. The 
form of the Agreement ignored principles of uniformity and equality by attempting to 
refund property taxes without reference to fair market value. 
The Agreement was rejected by the Tax Commission, a condition precedent to its 
validity and was initially rejected by the Tax Court. When ATK dismissed its personal 
property administrative tax appeal, the Tax Court lost jurisdiction over the Agreement. 
For all the reasons stated herein and in Gardner's initial brief, the Court should 
rule that the Agreement is void, unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable, and deny the 
award of Attorney fees. The Court should further remand the matter back to the Tax 
Court for further proceedings to establish fair market value assessments consistent with 
Utah law. Upon remand, Gardner again urges the Court to change venue and substitute a 
different Judge based on the lack of resources and difficult caseload expressed below by 
Judge Davis. 
DATED this 1st day of October, 2004. 
Kelly W. Wrfight 
Attorney fori Appellant LielGardner 
Salt Lake County Assessor 
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